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FDI ACTIVITY AND WORKER COMPENSATION: EVIDENCE FROM US NON- 
    MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This study examines worker compensation effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
activity in US non-manufacturing industry sectors. A clustered standard error correction 
is used when estimating wage and non-wage compensation equations, with special 
attention given to FDI’s effect by worker educational attainment and union status. Wage 
findings reveal that FDI activity is associated with a wage premium for highly educated 
non-union workers and with union rent erosion for all educational-gender groups 
excluding females with low educational attainment.  Non-wage compensation analysis 
reveals FDI activity is generally associated with significantly higher probabilities of 
workers receiving employer financed non-wage compensation for union and non-union 
workers regardless of their level of educational attainment.  
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FDI ACTIVITY AND WORKER COMPENSATION: EVIDENCE FROM US NON-
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES. 
  
I. Introduction 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a common form of globalization that enhances 
international competition and has important implications for domestic labor markets. 
Most labor market studies focus on the wage and employment effects of FDI in 
manufacturing industries. Examining labor market outcomes in these industries is 
significant in part because they are vital to national economies and provide jobs that pay 
well.  Findings from research on FDI suggest that such industry activity contributes to the 
welfare of workers in manufacturing by promoting higher domestic wages in developed 
countries (Lipsey, Sjöholm, 2004 and Almeida, 2007).  These countries, however, are 
experiencing a significant shift away from manufacturing as the interest of foreign 
investors also shifts away from these industries.  In 1987 40.64 percent of domestic US 
workers employed by foreign owners worked in manufacturing industry sectors.  In 
contrast, by 2007 this group of domestic workers comprised only 29.99 percent of the 
work force employed by foreign owners in the US.
1
  This employment trend has major 
implications for a growing share of workers in developed countries, yet there is a dearth 
of research examining the effect of FDI activity on labor earnings in non-manufacturing 
industries.  
This study contributes to the body of research on labor markets by examining the 
effect of FDI activity on wage and non-wage compensation in non-manufacturing 
industry sectors in the US.  The analytical framework used to examine the labor market in 
                                                 
1
 Information on US domestic employment by foreign owners is taken from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) Foreign Direct Investment Establishment Data for 1987 and 2002.   
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non-manufacturing industries differs from that used to study the labor market for 
manufacturing industries, since it is acquisition of knowledge based skills such as an 
understanding of financial instrument, health care techniques, and logistics operations, 
rather than the operation of machinery that matters more for the productivity and 
performance in most non-manufacturing industry sectors.  Hence, this study focuses on 
the role of educational attainment as a factor determinant of labor compensation.  We test 
whether foreign investment is associated with a pay premium for highly educated 
workers.  We also test whether foreign investment is associated with labor cost saving 
behavior by examining FDI‟s influence on union premiums.  By examining FDI‟s 
influence on union premiums we also consider foreign investors‟ labor saving practices. 
These tests are performed using information on workers‟ wages as well as using 
information on workers‟ pension and health care coverage.  Including non-wage 
compensation in the analysis of FDI‟s labor market effect is new to the literature and is 
significant in part because pension and health care benefits account for a large share of 
firms‟ labor cost and thus can be viewed as a potentially large source of cost-savings by 
foreign investors.  
 
II. Potential Labor Market Effects of FDI 
Standard FDI theory suggests the opportunity to gain market power in the host 
country through cost savings creates an incentive for foreign investment (Dunning, 1977, 
1981).
2
  Within this conceptual framework foreign investors in non-manufacturing 
                                                 
2
 The conceptual framework Dunning (1977, 1981) uses to examine FDI identifies three categories for enhancing 
foreign owner‟s market power. Within this framework foreign owners decide to invest abroad if they have ownership 
advantage, location advantage, or internalization advantage. Ownership advantage is the market power arising from the 
ownership of a patent, blueprint or reputation regarding products or production processes. Location advantage 
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industries are likely to take advantage of productivity enhancing knowledge that is unique 
to the foreign owner and is not readily available to domestic producers in the host 
country, (Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey, 1995).  Productivity gains in the non-
manufacturing sector arise because competitive foreign owned firms are reported to 
possess intangible assets such as technological know-how, marketing, and managerial 
skills.  Making the best use of such assets requires employment and retention of highly 
skilled and well-educated workers. Foreign investors in non-manufacturing industries, 
therefore, have an incentive to offer high compensation to attract highly educated 
workers. Upward pressure on wages of highly educated and skilled workers also arises 
from foreign firms competing with their domestic rivals for workers from the same 
domestic pool of qualified local workers (Martins, 2004).  
Empirical evidence used to examine the educational background of workers in 
relation to foreign investment primarily focuses on labor markets in manufacturing 
industries and supports the notion that compared to domestic firms foreign-owned firms 
pay higher wages for workers with a given level of education. For instance, Lipsey 
(1994) reports that foreign owned establishments tend to be in higher wage industries, but 
still pay higher wages within these industries.  These high wages, though, are not 
necessarily due to foreign acquisition improving the overall level of education of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
contribute  to foreign owners market power if producing in a foreign market presents cost advantages that are not 
available from producing at home or exporting.  Low transportation costs, avoidance of tariffs and quotas, and easy 
access to customers overseas are examples to cost-saving advantages associated with location choice. Last, 
internalization advantage is the gains foreign owners derive from providing a service through their own foreign 
subsidiaries as opposed to selling the blueprint to a foreign firm and monitoring through business agreements. The 
internalization advantage of the FDI is most appropriate for the analysis of this study because the nature of the services 
provided by non-manufacturing industry sectors requires that the knowledge of business operations is mostly 
accumulated and retained in the company as opposed to being transferred across borders. These intangible assets are 
not easily relocated; therefore foreign-investors in non-manufacturing sectors are motivated to take steps toward 
building those assets in the best way that they can. The most apparent way to achieve the internalization of the 
intangible assets is derived from choosing and keeping the most skilled and well-educated workers. The foreign 
investor, therefore, has an incentive to offer higher compensation to highly educated workers. 
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industry work force.  Rather, findings from past research by Almeida (2007) suggests that 
foreign investors are likely to select the best performing domestic firms that employ 
already highly skilled and productive workers. 
 Even though past evidence suggests that while the employment of highly 
educated workers contributes to relative high wages paid by foreign owners, FDI activity 
may not always promote elevated wage levels.  Foreign owners might seek a competitive 
advantage by eliminating economically unjustifiable high labor costs such as union rent.  
Research identifies union rent as a potential source of such cost savings.  For instance, 
Zhao (1998) reveals that greater FDI activity actually depresses the wages of union 
members even if their union representative tries to obtain high wage levels at the expense 
of job loss.
3
  Empirical evidence reporting FDI activity‟s effect on union wages supports 
Zhao‟s hypotheses by revealing that FDI is associated with declining union wages paid to 
male workers in manufacturing compared to increasing wages for nonunion male workers 
in US manufacturing (Alhakimi, and Peoples, 2009).  
 In sum, this review of past research reveals the significance of access to a highly 
educated work force and the opportunity to reduce union rent as factors influencing FDI‟s 
effect on domestic wages in manufacturing.  Extending the analysis to labor markets in 
non-manufacturing industries allows for testing whether the role of education is critical in 
these sectors, especially given that many of these industries sectors rely heavily on the 
services of workers in professional, scientific and management fields, as well as in 
finance, insurance, or educational services.   Extending the analysis to examine FDI 
                                                 
3
 Zhao's findings are driven by two FDI effects. One is the collusion effect, which models two 
multinationals cooperating against the labor union to negotiate lower wages.  The other FDI effect is 
depicted by the foreign owner's ability to reassign operations to lower wage locations overseas as leverage 
to negotiate lower wages at current domestic locations. 
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activity‟s influence on union wage premiums in non-manufacturing industries is 
significant in part because many non-manufacturing US industries experiencing FDI 
activity are some of the most unionized sector of the private sectors.
4
   
A more complete analysis of FDI‟s influence on wage payments to highly 
educated workers and union workers also requires examination of non-wage 
compensation.  Economic theory suggests that employers use funding of non-wage 
compensation such as pension and health care plans as an incentive to maintain 
productive workers.   Within the conceptual framework of this study, foreign investors 
demand for highly skilled and educated workers suggests that they have an incentive to 
offer fringe benefits to domestic workers.  In addition, compared to domestic employers, 
foreign owners may have greater incentive to provide their employees the opportunity to 
receive employer funded non-wage compensation packages because these owners face 
greater public scrutiny over their labor practices.  A high probability of public 
disapproval arises because these owners are likely to have a shorter history with the 
domestic work force and as a result are viewed by the public as outsiders exploiting the 
vulnerability of indigenous workers (Alhakimi, and Peoples, 2009). Still, there are 
instances when foreign investors may be inclined to pare back funding on non-wage 
compensation such as relatively expensive union pension and health care plans.  Foreign 
owners are in a position to avoid public backlash from negotiating union concessions 
over benefits if they are viewed as promoting the development of local labor markets by 
                                                 
4
 Metal mining, coal mining and urban transportation services constitute industries with the highest amount 
of foreign investment in US non-manufacturing industries.  Information from the 2002 Foreign Direct 
Investment establishment files reveals that respectively 39.7, 19.3 and 26.6 percent of workers in these 
industries are employed by foreign owners in 2002.  Union information reported on Barry Hirsch and 
David Mcpherson‟s union source web-site reveals that  for the same year 23.5, 22.5 and 38.0 percent of the 
workers in employed in these industries belonged to a union, compared to only 14 percent for the entire US 
work force (www.unionstats.com). 
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investing in non-manufacturing industries that historically experience decreasing 
employment.  Indeed, metal and coal mining are two US non-manufacturing industries 
that have experienced significant job losses in the recent past and now receive non-trivial 
investment from foreign owners.
5
    
Even if foreign owners have the latitude to negotiate concessions for non-wage 
compensation without severe public outrage, union workers may avoid reductions of 
fringe benefit coverage because unions are motivated to negotiate low wage gains as a 
tradeoff for the maintenance of these highly valued pension and health care plans.   This 
lack of a definitive hypothesis on FDI activity‟s influence on non-wage compensation 
patterns underscores the need to include empirical analysis that explores this component 
of the worker compensation package. 
 
III. Data and Empirical Approach 
This study uses several sources to examine FDI activity‟s influence on labor 
compensation in non-manufacturing industries.  These sources include industry 
information on FDI activity and worker information on individuals‟ personal 
characteristics, union status, educational attainment level and labor compensation. The 
FDI measure used in this study is taken from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
Foreign Direct Investment Establishment Data for 2002
6
.  Foreign-owned employment 
                                                 
5
 Employment in US metal and coal mining fell from 66,458 and 174,880 to 44,466 and 96,881 
respectively from 1983 to 2009.  Union membership in these highly unionized industries fell from 25,759 
and 107,502 to 13,064 and 79,327 over the same period.  Source:  www.unionstats.com.   
 
6
 FDI Industry information is published in the US Bureau of Economic Analysis‟ publication titled,  
“Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Establishment Data for 2002.” Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office, June 2007.  This data source contains the most recent industry information on 
FDI activity. 
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shares of the non-manufacturing US industry work force are calculated at the 4-digit 
NAICS industry level; 145 non-manufacturing industries are classified at this level.  
Information on individual workers is taken from the 2002 Current Population 
Survey Outgoing Rotation Group files (CPS-ORG)
7
, and from the 2002 March CPS files. 
Individual information on worker characteristics and hourly wages are presented in the 
CPS-ORG files while individual information and non-wage compensation information 
depicting whether a worker received employer funded pension plan or health care 
coverage is taken from the March files.  The sample populations constructed from both 
sources are limited to individual respondents age 16 and older.  The observation sizes 
derived from applying this limitation are 173,353 and 9,901, respectively.   These sources 
on individual worker information use three-digit Census codes to identify individual 
workers‟ industry of employment.  Industry information from these data sources are 
matched with industry information from the BEA Foreign Direct Investment 
Establishment Data by using industry value-added output weights to obtain industry 
measures at the four digit NAICS level and then recoded to correspond to the census 
equivalent using the Bureau of Labor Statistics industry code conversion.
8
 
These data are initially used to estimate the following wage equation separately 
for men and women by educational attainment level:  
 
Ln(wage)j = 0 +1Z j + 2estb-sizej + 3FDI j +4union j +5(FDIunion) j +  j      (1) 
 
                                                 
7
 Current Population Survey (CPS) Labor Extracts 1976-2006, NBER January 2007 
8
 Combining FDI data from Census Bureau and domestic data from BEA is also found in Feliciano and 
Lipsey (2006) 
 
  8 
where „j‟ indexes individual workers and the dependent variable is the log of real hourly 
wages of the j
th
 worker.
9
  The matrix Z consists of a set of worker residency and worker 
profile variables.
10
  These explanatory variables include residency dummies for US 
geographic regions, and metropolitan residency status.  The worker profile measures are 
dummies depicting a worker‟s marital, US citizenship, race, full-time, occupational and 
educational attainment status, as well as the age and age-squared of the individual worker.  
The variable estb-size denotes the average number of workers employed by establishments 
in the individual worker‟s employing industry. It is included to account for the possibility 
that large establishments generate rent that can be shared with workers. The variable FDI 
measures the share of workers employed by foreign owners for a given industry.  The 
variable union is a dummy equaling one if the individual belongs to a union.  The final 
variable presented in equation (1) is the interaction of the FDI and union variables. 
The coefficients that are of special interest to this study are 3, 4, and 3+5. The 
coefficient 3 measures the percentage wage change associated with a percentage change 
in FDI activity for non-union workers.  The coefficient 4 measures the union log wage 
differential for workers employed in industries that did not experience foreign investment 
for the observation year.
 11
  Last, the sum of the estimated coefficients 3+5 measures 
the log wage change associated with a percentage change in FDI activity for union 
workers.   
                                                 
9
 Hourly wage rates are calculated by taking the ratio of individual workers‟ weekly earnings and weekly 
hours worked. 
10
 A description of the explanatory variables is presented in Table A.1 of the appendix. 
11
 Estimated coefficients are converted to percentage differentials by using the formula (-1)100. 
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Non-wage labor compensation equations identifying whether workers are covered 
by healthcare or pension plans are also estimated.  The specification of the healthcare, 
and pension plan equations are depicted by the following equations. 
 
Pr(pension=1) = { 1 + 2Z +3estb-sizej + 4FDIj + 5unionj + 6(FDIjunionj +  j}     (2) 
Pr(healthcare=1) = { 1+ 2Z +3estb-sizej +4FDIj +5unionj + 6(FDIjunionj +  j)}  (3) 
 
where  is a normal probability function, and healthcare and pension are binary 
variables with a value of one if a worker is covered by an employee financed health or 
pension plan, respectively, and zero if the worker is not covered.  The explanatory 
variables are the same as those used in the earnings equation.  The coefficients of key 
interest are 4, 5, and 4 + 6.  The estimated coefficient 4 measures the marginal effect 
of FDI on in the likelihood of a non-union worker receiving the respective health or 
pension plan coverage.  The estimated coefficient 5 measures the union-non-union 
differential in the likelihood that a worker receives the respective health or pension plan 
coverage.  The sum of the estimated coefficients on the variable foreign and the variable 
foreignunion measures the marginal effect of FDI on the likelihood a union worker 
receiving the respective health or pension plan coverage.   
All three equations are estimated using a clustered standard error correction 
technique that takes into account the possibility that individual worker observations    
within the 145 industry groups are correlated.  While estimates using an OLS technique 
are not biased for this type of data structure inference testing for industry parameters 
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would tend to exaggerate their statistical significance for these individual worker-level 
equations.   
The variance-covariance matrix used to compute the clustered standard errors is 
constructed as follows: 
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where the symbol n is the total number of observations for all individual workers in the 
sample, k denotes the number of parameter estimates, M denotes the number, and of 
industry clusters, X is the information matrix, Ψ denotes the within-industry cluster 
weighted sum of individual worker-level contributions to the change in the log likelihood 
function with respect to a change in the vector of parameter estimates, and the symbol h 
denotes individual industries (Huber 1967 and White, 1980). Using this method to adjust 
standard errors accounts for correlation across individual worker observations within the 
same industry. The random effects technique is an alternative approach that is commonly 
used to yield consistent estimates if the error term consists of more than one component.  
This technique is generally applied when using panel data to account for across industry 
correlation, however, the information data matrix used in this study is stacked cross-
section data for a single year.
12
  Therefore, we limit our analysis to the examination of the 
clustered standard error correction results. 
 
IV. Findings 
Wage Results 
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 Estimates using the OLS and random effect were still performed and are presented in Tables A.2 and 
A.3. 
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The contents of Table-1 contain the wage results from estimating equation (1) for men 
and women by educational attainment level.
13
  Workers who completed college are 
classified in the high education sample. The findings on the parameter estimates of the 
control variables are consistent with standard economic theory.  For instance, wage levels 
are statistically significantly higher for US citizens, those individuals residing in a 
metropolitan area, residing in the northeast quadrant of the US, married, non-minority, 
work full-time, are older, and are employed in professional occupations.  Last, 
employment in a large establishment is associated with statistically significantly higher 
wages only for female workers.  
 Findings on the key parameter FDI, which is (3) in equation (1), suggest that 
foreign direct investment activity is associated with an educational premium for highly 
educated non-union workers.  For instance, the contents in columns (1) and (2) of the first 
row of Table-1 show wages increase a statistically significant 1.5 and 0.95 percent for 
each one percentage point increase in FDI activity for highly educated on-union women 
and men, respectively.  These wage findings contrast sharply with the findings for non-
union workers who don‟t acquire a college education as the contents of columns (3) and 
(4) of the first row show wages do not change significantly with changes in FDI activity. 
 Findings on the parameter union, which is (4) in equation (1), suggest that union 
workers employed in industries without FDI activity receive a statistically significant 
premium over non-union workers employed in these industries.  For instance, the 
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 Wage findings derived from using OLS and random effects estimation techniques are presented in Tables 
A.2 and A.3 of the appendix.  These results for the estimated coefficients generally resemble the results 
derived from correcting for clustered standard errors.  The level of statistical significance for the corrected 
clustered standard error results; though, are generally smaller than that reported when using OLS and 
random effect estimations.  The only notable difference among the key estimated coefficients is the 
relatively large and statistically significant value of the FDI parameter for highly educated men arising 
from the estimation results using the random effects technique. 
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contents in the second row of Table-1 shows union workers employed in non-FDI 
industries receive wages that are 8.18 and 12.80 percent higher than wages for non-union 
worker in these industries, respectively for highly educated women and men and 13.76 
and 29.73 percent higher, respectively for women and men with low educational 
attainment.
14
  These union wage results for workers in non-FDI industries differ 
markedly from the findings for union workers employed in industries with FDI activity as 
the estimated coefficient on the union×FDI interaction term indicates a statistically 
significant erosion of the union premium for women in both educational attainment 
groups and for men in the low educational attainment group.  Using the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term and the union status parameter at the mean FDI activity 
value of 5.4 percent gives union premiums of 3.19, 6.32 and 26.4 percent for highly 
educated women and men and low education attaining men, respectively.
15
  
 
Non-wage Compensation Results   
The contents of Tables 2 and 3 contain the pension and health care results derived from 
estimating equations (2) and (3), respectively.  The findings on the control variables for 
the pension estimates in Table 2 suggest that workers who are US citizens, employed 
fulltime, attain a higher level of education within each education group and workers 
employed in large establishments have a statistically significantly higher probability of 
receiving employer funder pension.    The findings on the control variables for the health 
care estimates in Table 3 suggest that workers who are older, work fulltime, and are 
                                                 
14
 Note that these estimated coefficients are converted to percentage changes using the following equation: 
(4-1)100. 
 
15
 The mean value of FDI activity is taken from the BEA Foreign Direct Investment Establishment Data for 
2002. 
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employed in large establishments have a statistically significantly higher probability of 
receiving employer funder health care benefits.   
 Findings for the estimated coefficient on the FDI parameter suggest that in 
general foreign direct investment activity is associated with a statistically significant 
increase in the probability a worker receives employer funded health care.  For instance, 
the contents of the first row of Table 2 indicate a one percentage point increase in FDI 
activity is associated with1.09, 0.43 and 0.87 percent increase in the respective 
probability of high education attainment non-union males and low education attainment 
non-union females and males receiving health care coverage.
16
 The contents of the first 
row of Table 3 indicate a one percentage point increase in FDI activity is associated 
with1.04, 0.43 and 0.59 percent increase in the respective probability of non-union high 
education attainment males and non-union low education attainment females and males 
receiving health care coverage. 
Findings reported in row (2) of Tables 2 and 3 for the estimated coefficient on the 
union parameter suggest that low education attainment union workers employed in non-
FDI industries are statistically significantly more likely to receive pension and health care 
coverage compared to low education attainment non-union workers in these industries.  
For instance, the union-non-union pension coverage probability differential is 17.94 and 
30.77 percent for low educational attainment women and men in non-FDI activity 
industry sectors, respectively. The health care coverage differential is 24.12 and 23.57 for 
low educational attainment women and men in non-FDI activity industry sectors, 
respectively.  The only worker group classified in the high education attainment that has 
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 While these percentage changes may seem small, the predicted FDI-non-FDI pension probability 
differential for a high educational attainment non-union male employed in metal mining, which is the 
industry with the highest level of FDI activity (39.7percent), is 43.27 percent. 
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a statistically significant union-non-union fringe benefit probability differential is women 
receiving health care coverage. That differential is 27.24 percent, which is comparable to 
the differential for women in the low education attainment sample and is appreciably 
higher than the non-significant differential for men in the high education attainment 
sample.   
In general FDI activity does not significantly change union-nonunion benefit 
coverage differentials.  The findings for the estimated coefficients on the union×FDI 
parameter suggests a statistically significant change only for highly educated men 
receiving employer funded pension coverage and highly educated women receiving 
employer funded health care coverage.  Using the coefficient estimate on the interaction 
term and the union status parameter at the mean FDI activity value of 5.4 percent gives a 
union-non-union pension coverage probability differential equaling 23.74 percent for 
highly educated men and a 2.4 percent health care probability differential for highly 
educated women.  Interestingly, the union-non-union pension differential for highly 
educated men employed in the hypothetical mean FDI activity industry sector resembles 
the differential for low education attainment women in non-FDI industries. It is also 
interesting to note that the union-non-union health coverage probability differential for 
highly educated women calculated at the mean FDI activity level falls to a level that more 
closely resembles the probability level of highly educated men in non-FDI industries. 
 
V. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
This study examines the labor market consequences of FDI activity in non-manufacturing 
industries by estimating wage and non-wage compensation equations for US domestic 
  15 
workers.  Insights from past research on manufacturing industries reveal the importance 
of workers‟ level of educational attainment and their union status as determinants of 
wage levels for domestic workers employed in foreign owned companies.  Within this 
study‟s conceptual framework we hypothesize that foreign owners are motivated to pay a 
premium for highly educated workers as well as reduce pay premiums for union workers.  
 Wage findings are consistent with the study‟s hypotheses as we find highly 
educated non-union workers receive an FDI wage premium, and union workers employed 
in FDI industries receive relative smaller wage premiums compared to wage premiums 
for union workers in non-FDI industries.  Union wage findings are consistent with the 
argument that foreign investors exhibit cost-saving behavior when making labor market 
decisions.  Non-union wage findings do not necessarily contradict the labor cost-savings 
framework used in this study assuming the attainment of a high level of education is 
associated with high productivity. Non-wage compensation findings are new and provide 
the opportunity to examine whether the wage pattern associated with FDI activity is 
indicative of overall compensation trends.  Non-wage compensation patterns for non-
union workers do resemble wage patterns for highly educated non-union workers, as high 
FDI activity is associated with a higher probability that non-union workers receive fringe 
benefits.   Union workers employed in FDI industries are just as likely as non-union 
workers employed in these industries to receive fringe benefits.  These wage and non-
wage compensation findings for union workers are interesting in that they comport well 
with the notion that unions are willing to compromise on wage gains as a tradeoff for 
maintaining union fringe benefits for their members.   
  16 
 We interpret the wage and non-wage compensation findings from this study to 
suggest that domestic non-union workers in the US are the primary labor market 
beneficiaries of FDI activity, and highly educated non-union workers is the group that 
benefited the most.  Non-trivial compensation gains for non-union workers are significant 
given that this group of workers accounts for nearly 90 percent of the payroll of non-
manufacturing industries.
17
  The unmatched wage gains experience by highly educated 
non-union workers employed in industries with high FDI activity underscores the 
growing importance of education in a globalized society.  
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 Information taken from Hirsch and Mcpherson‟s union source web-site shows that only 11.2 percent of 
US workers employed in non-manufacturing industry sectors were union members for 2002.  Source: 
www.uionstats.com 
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Table 1: Clustered Standard Errors Regression Results Derived From Estimating Wage 
Equation (1) 
  HIGH EDUCATION LOW EDUCATION 
Ln(wage)  Female Male Female Male 
      
FDI  0.0153269 0.0095177 0.0034188 0.0019711 
  (3.34) (2.74) (0.91) (0.75) 
Union  0.0786917 0.1205889 0.1282906 0.2603429 
  (2.42) (1.74) (4.74) (13.93) 
union×FDI  -0.00924 -0.012455 -0.001022 -0.006154 
  (-1.76) (-1.9) (-0.32) (-2.23) 
US Citizen  0.1118319 0.0432936 0.0888304 0.1257616 
  (3.63) (1.06) (5.91) (12.19) 
HS Diploma  ____ ____ 0.1671213 0.165787 
  ____ ____ (11.81) (19.17) 
Some College  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
BA  -0.149069 -0.111567 ____ ____ 
  (-5.27) (-6.01) ____ ____ 
Graduate  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
  ____ ____ ____ ____ 
Metropolitan  0.1723901 0.1793114 0.1121198 0.0576698 
  (7.6) (8.47) (13.57) (7.09) 
Veteran  -0.020568 -0.01751 0.0596064 0.028958 
  (-0.73) (-0.98) (1.47) (2.64) 
Married  0.0306668 0.1088576 0.02635 0.1019796 
  (3.41) (9.67) (2.89) (7.04) 
White  0.0606397 0.0630981 0.0343867 0.0805675 
  (4.51) (3.53) (3.5) (9.12) 
Full Time  0.0747657 0.0780009 0.1176016 0.1508567 
  (2.84) (2.93) (8.34) (5.2) 
Sales  0.4189561 0.4442959 0.155592 0.0716674 
  (7.3) (11.6) (4.87) (2.62) 
Service  0.1525818 -0.050078 -0.000317 -0.14333 
  (2.82) (-1.21) (-0.01) (-4.92) 
Craft  0.430703 0.2905033 0.1797234 0.201192 
  (4.9) (8.18) (3.53) (8.6) 
Professional  0.7036543 0.6476477 0.3603136 0.311539 
  (12.25) (18.79) (11.14) (12.07) 
North East  0.0120414 0.0320201 0.0237618 0.0112309 
  (0.7) (2.36) (2.3) (1.3) 
Midwest  -0.052473 -0.035431 -0.023077 -0.024855 
  (-3.9) (-2.82) (-2.18) (-2.15) 
South  -0.049903 -0.021519 -0.065062 -0.057331 
  (-3.26) (-1.56) (-6.78) (-3.11) 
Age  0.0560479 0.0571884 0.0258463 0.0359939 
  (17.14) (13.19) (8.94) (10.97) 
Age
2 
 -0.000624 -0.00059 -0.000263 -0.000381 
  (-15.39) (-11.88) (-8.25) (-10.56) 
Estb-size  0.0001769 -2.55E-05 0.0001056 -0.000055 
  (4.47) (-0.55) (2.92) (-1.46) 
Constant  0.8250191 0.9672493 1.16075 1.128973 
  (8.58) (8.21) (15.73) (27.13) 
R-sq  0.22 0.19 0.24 0.31 
#Obs  12702 13664 22708 24685 
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 Table 2:  Probit Estimation for Pension Plan Equation (2) that Corrects for Clustered 
Standard Errors 
 
Variables   High Education  Low Education 
   Female   Male  Female   Male 
 
FDI   .0040602 .0109915    .0043113 .0087435 
   (1.36)  (4.45)  (1.88)  (4.48) 
Union   .0915592    .0586842 .1794713 .3077718     
   (1.48)  (0.91)  (3.30)  (8.49) 
Union×FDI  -.000587  .0331074    .0005256 -.0036101      
   (-0.05)  (1.83)  (0.09)  (-0.77) 
US Citizen  .1631922  .1884873    .1216319   .182949  
   (3.14)  (4.28)  (3.16)  (5.80) 
War Veteran  .0124993    -.0202069    -.0010837 .0682783    
   (0.14)  (-0.63)  (-0.01)  (2.27) 
Married   .0264702    .0653335 -.0022284 .047549     
(1.01)       (2.51)     (-0.10)  (2.14) 
White   -.0323683    .0112392    -.0354241  .0295914  
   (-1.05)  (0.38)  (-1.40)  (1.17) 
Metropolitan  .0054536 -.0304985    -.0151474  -.0470564     
     (0.19)  (-1.22)  (-0.63)  (-1.99) 
Fulltime   .1769599    .2613282 .1831122    .2145948     
   (5.83)  (5.00)  (8.30)  (7.03) 
Age   .0077512    .0108818    .016892   .0057405     
(1.02)          (1.72)  (4.01)  (1.30) 
Age
2
   -.000084 -.0001502 -.0001638   -.0000493     
   (-0.95)  (-2.14)  (-3.26)  (-0.93) 
Diploma   .0541418    -.0038845 .0881858   .0817106     
   (1.90)  (-0.16)  (3.61)  (3.53) 
North East  -.0072237    -.0011117 .0134335 -.0156554    
   (-0.21)     (-0.04)  (0.48)  (-0.56) 
Mid West  .0161703    .0172312    .0305043  .032086       
   (0.47)  (0.58)  (1.12)  (1.19) 
South   -.0418635    -.0058193    -.0409994 -.0303513     
   (-1.23)  (-0.20)  (-1.53)  (-1.20) 
Professional  .0933863    .2672023    .1211621  .1040621     
   (0.89)  (5.11)  (2.63)  (2.86) 
Sales   .0106139    .1734151    .1232225 .078151    
   (0.10)  (3.85)  (3.16)  (2.82) 
Service   -.1586223    .065233   -.046516   -.0476878     
   (-1.29)  (1.01)  (-1.15)  (-1.67) 
Craft   .0184237    .0732173    .0792284  -.0255243     
   (0.12)  (1.24)  (1.24)  (-1.02) 
Estb-size  .0002728    .0001417   .0003941  .0004412      
   (5.74)  (2.58)  (8.13)   (5.38)   
Number of Obs.  1608  1826  3185  3282 
Likelihood Ratio  171.06  185.95  542.46  562.53 
Z-scores presented in parentheses 
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Table 3:  Probit Estimation for Health Insurance Coverage Equation (3) that Corrects for 
Clustered Standard Errors 
 
Variables   High Education   Low Education 
   Female   Male  Female   Male 
 
FDI   .0104399    .0059953    .0015647    .0059696    
   (3.06)  (2.71)  (0.68)  (2.92) 
Union   .2724604 .0757699    .2412053   .3357887     
   (3.96)  (1.16)  (4.46)  (8.63) 
Union×FDI  -.0461613    .0388499    -.0074881 -.00353        
   (-2.62)  (1.49)  (-1.32)  (-0.70) 
US Citizen  .0895324  .0564593    .0569383   .1302489     
   (1.58)  (1.48)  (1.53)  (4.05) 
War Veteran  -.0239216    -.0086791 -.1216323   .0926561     
   (-0.23)  (-0.30)  (-1.49)  (2.93) 
Married   -.2127417    .0026028   -.1408328    .0198835    
   -7.41  (0.11)  (-6.64)  (0.87) 
White   .0025886    .025449    -.0141011    -.0019492     
   (0.07)  (0.93)  (-0.56)  (-0.07) 
Metropolitan  .0525709   -.0140502  -.0241805   -.0340962    
     (1.67)  (-0.61)  (-1.02)  (-1.38) 
Fulltime   .4257986  .3089571     .3471277  .3932784     
   (12.87)  (6.24)  (16.33)  (12.08) 
Age   .0270593    .0097138  .0297633   .0288825     
   (3.10)  (1.68)  (6.83)  (6.23) 
Age
2
   -.0003185  -.0001171 -.0002786 -.0002809     
   (3.09)  (-1.81)  (-5.38)  (-5.08) 
Diploma   .0427688    -.0063163    .1189225  .1148187      
   (1.35)  (-0.29)  (4.82)  (4.74) 
North East  -.044067     -.0354629   .0038685 -.0353992      
   (-1.13)  (-1.29)  (0.14)  (-1.20) 
Mid West  -.0601951  -.0021028 -.0241533 .0070484       
   (-1.55)  (-0.08)  (-0.89)  (0.25) 
South   -.0428577 .0116875 -.0173847   .0005392     
   (-1.12)  (0.44)  (-0.65)  (0.02) 
Professional  .1537134   .1357597 .1620203  .1167862      
   (1.23)  (2.80)  (3.40)  (3.04) 
Sales   .0711914 .0526701    .1237474    .0078272     
   (0.59)  (1.17)  (3.11)  (0.27) 
Service   -.0711108 -.0132976    .1937834   -.1485375     
   (-0.52)  (-0.20)  (0.71)  (-4.82) 
Craft   .1365606    -.0173189 .082072  -.0106733       
   (0.85)  (-0.29)  (2.37)  (-0.41) 
Estb-size      .0002179    .0000952     .0002071  .0002332     
   (4.35)  (1.89)  (4.53)  (2.86) 
Number of Obs.  1608  1826  3185  3282   
Likelihood Ratio  398.07  133.12  889.08  1062.65 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Z-scores presented in parentheses 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Description of Variables 
 
Variable Description 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
FDI Foreign direct Investment measured as the percentage of US workers 
employed in the foreign-owned establishments. 
Union  Dummy variable equaling 1if a worker belongs to a union. 
US Citizen Dummy equaling 1 if a worker is a US citizen. 
HS Diploma Dummy equaling 1 if a worker attained at most a high school diploma 
Some College Dummy equaling 1 if a worker attended college and receive at most an 
Associate‟s degree. 
BA Dummy equaling 1 if a worker attended college and received a Bachelor‟s 
degree 
Graduate Dummy equaling 1 if a worker attended college and received at minimum 
a Master‟s degree 
Metropolitan Dummy equaling 1 if a worker resides in a standard statistical 
metropolitan area 
Veteran  Dummy equaling 1 if a worker is a war veteran 
Married Dummy equaling 1 if a worker is married 
White Dummy equaling 1 if a worker‟s race is white 
Full time Dummy equaling 1 if a worker is employed fulltime 
Sales Dummy equaling 1 if a worker‟s occupation is classified as technical, 
sales or administrative support. 
Service  Dummy equaling 1 if a worker‟s occupation is classified as service 
Craft Dummy equaling 1 if a worker‟s occupation is classified as craft 
Professional Dummy equaling 1 if a worker‟s occupation is classified as professional 
Laborer Dummy equaling 1 if a worker‟s occupation is classified as laborer, this is 
the benchmark comparison occupation 
North East Dummy equaling 1 if a worker resides in the north east quadrant of the US 
Midwest Dummy equaling 1 if a worker resides in the mid-west quadrant of the US 
South  Dummy equaling 1 if a worker resides in the southern quadrant of the US 
West Dummy equaling 1 if a worker resides in the western quadrant of the US, 
this is the benchmark comparison region 
Age  The worker‟s age in years 
Estb- size Establishment size measured as number of employees in all US 
establishments divided by the number of all US establishments. 
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TABLE A.2:  Wage Results for Three Alternative Estimation Approaches for the Sample of High 
Educational Attainment Workers 
 OLS   RANDOM EFFECTS   CLUSTER   
Ln(wage) Female Male  Female Male  Female Male 
         
FDI 0.0153269 0.0095177  0.0127524 0.0088235  0.0153269 0.0095177 
 (12.4) (8.34)  (5.49) (5.49)  (3.34) (2.74) 
Union 0.0786917 0.1205889  0.0841763 0.104501  0.0786917 0.1205889 
 (3.64) (4.35)  (3.95) (3.73)  (2.42) (1.74) 
union×FDI -0.00924 -0.012455  -0.00477 -0.008616  -0.00924 -0.012455 
 (-1.97) (-3.69)  (-1.03) (-2.49)  (-1.76) (-1.9) 
US Citizen 0.1118319 0.0432936  0.1062809 0.0430293  0.1118319 0.0432936 
 (5.9) (2.21)  (5.72) (2.22)  (3.63) (1.06) 
BA -0.149069 -0.111567  -0.142595 -0.092624  -0.149069 -0.111567 
 (-14.12) (-10.14)  (-13.62) (-8.21)  (-5.27) (-6.01) 
Metropolitan 0.1723901 0.1793114  0.1492172 0.1606282  0.1723901 0.1793114 
 (13.34) (12.04)  (11.77) (10.87)  (7.6) (8.47) 
Veteran -0.020568 -0.01751  -0.032223 -0.023473  -0.020568 -0.01751 
 (-0.53) (-1.17)  (-0.86) (-1.59)  (-0.73) (-0.98) 
Married 0.0306668 0.1088576  0.0252145 0.093815  0.0306668 0.1088576 
 (3.32) (9.79)  (2.79) (8.55)  (3.41) (9.67) 
White 0.0606397 0.0630981  0.0592754 0.0649026  0.0606397 0.0630981 
 (4.86) (4.2)  (4.85) (4.37)  (4.51) (3.53) 
Full Time 0.0747657 0.0780009  0.0579176 0.0679602  0.0747657 0.0780009 
 (7.23) (4.92)  (5.68) (4.34)  (2.84) (2.93) 
Sales 0.4189561 0.4442959  0.3366618 0.3941744  0.4189561 0.4442959 
 (9.42) (16.83)  (7.6) (14.65)  (7.3) (11.6) 
Service 0.1525818 -0.050078  0.1520479 0.0105801  0.1525818 -0.050078 
 (3.2) (-1.43)  (3.15) (0.29)  (2.82) (-1.21) 
Craft 0.430703 0.2905033  0.322906 0.2312498  0.430703 0.2905033 
 (5.99) (8.64)  (4.53) (6.8)  (4.9) (8.18) 
Professional 0.7036543 0.6476477  0.6430141 0.5890413  0.7036543 0.6476477 
 (15.91) (25.07)  (14.55) (22.36)  (12.25) (18.79) 
North East 0.0120414 0.0320201  0.0046805 0.0197185  0.0120414 0.0320201 
 (0.96) (2.36)  (0.38) (1.46)  (0.7) (2.36) 
Midwest -0.052473 -0.035431  -0.057013 -0.04217  -0.052473 -0.035431 
 (-4.15) (-2.55)  (-4.6) (-3.07)  (-3.9) (-2.82) 
South -0.049903 -0.021519  -0.061512 -0.026294  -0.049903 -0.021519 
 (-3.98) (-1.61)  (-5.02) (-1.99)  (-3.26) (-1.56) 
Age 0.0560479 0.0571884  0.0531641 0.0569855  0.0560479 0.0571884 
 (21.45) (20.35)  (20.8) (20.53)  (17.14) (13.19) 
Age
2 
-0.000624 -0.00059  -0.000586 -0.00058  -0.000624 -0.00059 
 (-20.42) (-18.77)  (-19.61) (-18.69)  (-15.39) (-11.88) 
Estb-size 0.0001769 -2.55E-05  0.0000712 0.0000272  0.0001769 -2.55E-05 
 (11.21) (-1.03)  (0.81) (0.43)  (4.47) (-0.55) 
Constant 0.8250191 0.9672493  0.9635049 0.9912658  0.8250191 0.9672493 
  (11.33) (14.11)   (13.17) (14.44)   (8.58) (8.21) 
R-Sq 0.22 0.19  0.21 0.19  0.22 0.19 
#Obs 12702 13664  12702 13664  12702 13664 
#Clusters 142 144  142 144  142 144 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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TABLE A.3: Wage Results for Three Alternative Estimation Approaches for the Sample of Low 
Educational Attainment Workers 
 OLS   RANDOM EFFECTS   CLUSTER  
Ln(wage) Female Male  Female Male  Female Male 
         
FDI 0.0034188 0.0019711  0.007427 0.0095352  0.0034188 0.0019711 
 (4.73) (2.91)  (4.48) (6.21)  (0.91) (0.75) 
Union 0.1282906 0.2603429  0.1151688 0.2267433  0.1282906 0.2603429 
 (8.1) (22.35)  (7.22) (19.14)  (4.74) (13.93) 
union×FDI -0.001022 -0.006154  0.0017279 -0.004871  -0.001022 -0.006154 
 (-0.54) (-4.48)  (0.89) (-3.37)  (-0.32) (-2.23) 
US Citizen 0.0888304 0.1257616  0.0748604 0.1209883  0.0888304 0.1257616 
 (7.67) (13.31)  (6.53) (12.94)  (5.91) (12.19) 
HS Diploma 0.1671213 0.165787  0.1457245 0.1590012  0.1671213 0.165787 
 (22.61) (23.42)  (19.96) (22.84)  (11.81) (19.17) 
Metropolitan 0.1121198 0.0576698  0.0980393 0.0645472  0.1121198 0.0576698 
 (16.48) (8.11)  (14.58) (9.13)  (13.57) (7.09) 
Veteran 0.0596064 0.028958  0.0405493 0.0166849  0.0596064 0.028958 
 (1.85) (3.06)  (1.28) (1.79)  (1.47) (2.64) 
Married 0.02635 0.1019796  0.0209696 0.0868141  0.02635 0.1019796 
 (4.11) (14.82)  (3.33) (12.84)  (2.89) (7.04) 
White 0.0343867 0.0805675  0.022294 0.0671428  0.0343867 0.0805675 
 (4.34) (9.26)  (2.85) (7.85)  (3.5) (9.12) 
Full Time 0.1176016 0.1508567  0.0988428 0.1261175  0.1176016 0.1508567 
 (18.24) (18.67)  (15.5) (15.79)  (8.34) (5.2) 
Sales 0.155592 0.0716674  0.1258263 0.0986479  0.155592 0.0716674 
 (13.2) (7.91)  (10.31) (10.11)  (4.87) (2.62) 
Service -0.000317 -0.14333  0.0220589 -0.060074  -0.000317 -0.14333 
 (-0.03) (-15.85)  (1.62) (-5.02)  (-0.01) (-4.92) 
Craft 0.1797234 0.201192  0.1488329 0.1649687  0.1797234 0.201192 
 (7.15) (25.38)  (5.91) (18.98)  (3.53) (8.6) 
Professional 0.3603136 0.311539  0.3423005 0.332913  0.3603136 0.311539 
 (25.98) (25.77)  (23.89) (26.62)  (11.14) (12.07) 
North East 0.0237618 0.0112309  0.0242071 0.017067  0.0237618 0.0112309 
 (2.78) (1.29)  (2.86) (1.99)  (2.3) (1.3) 
Midwest -0.023077 -0.024855  -0.020799 -0.019372  -0.023077 -0.024855 
 (-2.8) (-2.92)  (-2.56) (-2.31)  (-2.18) (-2.15) 
South -0.065062 -0.057331  -0.063184 -0.062484  -0.065062 -0.057331 
 (-8.08) (-7.2)  (-7.98) (-7.98)  (-6.78) (-3.11) 
Age 0.0258463 0.0359939  0.0231082 0.0338597  0.0258463 0.0359939 
 (21.79) (27.73)  (19.67 (26.35)  (8.94) (10.97) 
Age
2 
-0.000263 -0.000381  -0.000234 -0.000357  -0.000263 -0.000381 
 (-18.75) (-24.33)  (-16.88) (-23.09)  (-8.25) (-10.56) 
Estb- Size 0.0001056 -0.000055  0.0000586 -4.42E-05  0.0001056 -0.000055 
 (7.15) (-2.07)  (0.86) (-0.62)  (2.92) (-1.46) 
Constant 1.16075 1.128973  1.302939 1.147063  1.16075 1.128973 
  (41.88) (42.14)   (43.55) (39.1)   (15.73) (27.13) 
R-Sq 0.24 0.31  0.23 0.3  0.24 0.31 
#Obs 22708 24685  22708 24685  22708 24685 
#Clusters 144 143  144 143  144 143 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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